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Abstract 
 
We present a model of credit market sentiment in which investors form beliefs about future 
creditworthiness by extrapolating past defaults. Our key contribution is to model the endogenous 
two-way feedback between credit market sentiment and credit market outcomes. This feedback 
arises because investors’ beliefs depend on past defaults, but beliefs also drive future defaults 
through investors’ willingness to refinance debt at low interest rates. Our model is able to capture 
many documented features of credit booms and busts, including the link between credit growth 
and future returns, and the “calm before the storm” periods in which fundamentals have 
deteriorated but the credit market has not yet turned.  
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I. Introduction 
Recent empirical research in finance and economics has revived the idea that investor 
sentiment drives credit booms and busts. In their sweeping analysis of sovereign debt cycles over 
eight centuries, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that boom periods are sustained by investors’ 
incorrect perception that “this time is different.” In US corporate debt markets, Greenwood and 
Hanson (2013) show that times of high credit growth are associated with low future returns to 
credit investors. They interpret their findings to suggest that during periods of elevated sentiment, 
credit investors are subsequently surprised when firms default or downgrade. López-Salido, Stein, 
and Zakrajšek (2015) show that elevated credit market sentiment is closely tied to future 
contractions in aggregate economic activity.  
What drives sentiment in the credit markets?  In this paper, we present a model in which 
sentiment is driven by investors’ extrapolation of past credit market outcomes. Following periods 
of calm, with low or no defaults, investors believe that firms will be able to continue to service 
their debts. Conversely, following periods of turbulence, investors believe that defaults will remain 
elevated. In making this assumption, we draw on growing evidence across a variety of assets and 
investor types that expectations of financial markets outcomes are extrapolative (Greenwood and 
Shleifer 2014, Koijen, Schmeling, and Vrugt 2015), as well as some new evidence that we present 
here about extrapolation in credit markets. 
We consider a firm that invests in a series of short-term projects that require ongoing 
investment of capital, which the firm finances using debt that pays a fixed coupon until maturity, 
upon which the firm pays back the principal and issues new debt. Projects generate a random cash 
flow that varies according to the state of the economy. Investors do not directly observe the payoffs 
on the project, but may draw inferences about the state of the economy by the firm’s ability to 
continue making payments on the debt. If the firm’s debt rises above a level at which a leverage 
constraint binds, the firm defaults, and a fraction of the debt is written off.  
We introduce credit market sentiment into the model through the beliefs of investors, who 
must estimate the likelihood that the firm will default in the future, resulting in a loss of capital 
and coupon payments. Investors estimate this probability by extrapolating recent default behavior. 
We show that investors’ extrapolative beliefs lead to an endogenous two-way feedback between 
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investor sentiment and credit market outcomes. This feedback arises because investors’ beliefs 
depend on past defaults, but beliefs also drive future defaults through investors’ willingness to 
refinance debt.  
 
Figure 1. The Credit Cycle. 
Figure 1 illustrates the feedback loop. During credit booms, default rates are low and so 
bond investors believe that future default rates will continue to be low. In the near term, investors’ 
beliefs are self-fulfilling: the perception of low future defaults leads to rising bond prices, which, 
in turn, makes it easier for the firm to refinance existing debt and issue new debt. Holding constant 
the firm’s “fundamentals”, cheaper debt financing leads to slower debt accumulation and a near-
term decline in future defaults, which further reinforces investors’ beliefs.  
Conversely, suppose that the economy has just been through a wave of defaults. Since 
investors over-extrapolate these recent outcomes, credit market sentiment turns bearish and 
investors believe that likelihood of future defaults is high. Investors’ beliefs can turn out to be self-
fulfilling in the short run: bearish credit market sentiment makes it harder for firms to refinance 
existing debts, leading to an increase in defaults in the short run. In extreme circumstances, this 
can lead to default spirals in which defaults lead to more pessimism and further defaults. 
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In our model, transitions between credit booms and default spirals are ultimately caused by 
changes in fundamentals. However, because investors extrapolate past defaults and not 
fundamentals, transitions are not fully synchronized with changes in fundamentals, and can be 
highly path dependent. 
We show that during credit booms, elevated credit market sentiment due to low past 
defaults can enable borrowers to temporarily “paper-over” deteriorations in fundamentals, 
prolonging credit booms. But, elevated sentiment during these periods of poor fundamentals raises 
leverage, and thus financial fragility. And, because sentiment is high towards the end of the credit 
boom, credit markets frequently experience periods of “calm before the storm,” in which default 
rates are low just before they increase rapidly, a phenomenon that is prevalent in many historical 
accounts of the credit cycle (Klarman 1991, Eichengreen and Mitchener 2003). Overall, 
extrapolation makes the credit cycle far more persistent than the underlying fundamentals. 
The model has natural implications for return predictability emphasized in empirical 
studies of credit market sentiment (Greenwood and Hanson 2013, Baron and Xiong 2015). In the 
long term, poor fundamentals eventually cause defaults. Thus at long horizons, elevated credit 
market sentiment predicts high defaults and low returns. The dynamics of prices and returns vary 
by horizon: elevated credit market sentiment leads risky bonds to outperform in the short term, but 
to underperform in the long run. Our model also naturally generates the strong correlation between 
credit growth and low future returns shown in Greenwood and Hanson (2013). 
The narrative of credit booms and busts we have described does not hinge on whether debt 
is short-term or not. However, debt maturity does play a role, with shorter maturity debt enhancing 
the impact of investor sentiment and increasing fragility. We show that there are two effects. On 
the one hand, when debt is shorter-term, firm defaults are more exposed to investor sentiment 
because shorter term debt has to be rolled over more frequently, making the firm highly exposed 
to changes in investor beliefs. On the other hand, when debt is shorter term, changes in expected 
default probabilities have less of an impact on the price of debt, making it easier for the firm to 
expand or contract supply, irrespective of the level of sentiment. 
Our paper has much in common with Austrian theories of the credit cycle, including von 
Mises (1924), and von Hayek (1925), as well as Minsky (1986) and Kindleberger’s (1978) 
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accounts of booms, panics, and crashes. More recently, the idea that investors may neglect tail risk 
in credit markets was developed theoretically by Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012, 2015) and 
supported by numerous accounts of the financial crisis (Coval, Jurek and Stafford 2009, 
Krishnamurthy and Muir 2015, among many others). We also draw on growing evidence that 
investors extrapolate cash flows, past returns, or past crash occurrences (Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1998, Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer 2015, Jin 2015, Greenwood and Hanson 
2015). Most related here are Jin (2015) and Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2016). Jin (2015) 
presents a model in which investors’ perception of crash risk depends on recent experience. 
Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2016) also provide a model of credit cycles in which investor 
expectations also play an important role.1 Their model is similar to ours along some dimensions, 
but investor expectations in their model are based on the underlying fundamentals rather than 
credit market outcomes, which in our model are endogenous. In our model, this leads to episodes 
in which the credit market can become quite disconnected from fundamentals, and path dependent. 
Relatedly, our model provides a potential explanation for why credit cycles can be of longer 
duration than underlying fundamentals such as GDP growth, as has been documented by many 
authors.2 Overall, our contribution compared to previous work is on the propagation of credit 
cycles driven by the interplay between expectations and the refinancing nature of credit markets.3  
Section II summarizes some of the empirical evidence about credit booms and the 
associated mispricing of credit that our model can help explain. In Section III, we present the 
model and contrast it with the rational benchmark. Section IV compares simulated results in our 
model with time-series relationships in the data. Section V develops an extension with multiple 
firm types. The final section concludes.  
                                                            
1 See also Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) for a precursor to Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2016).  
2 See Taylor (2015) for an overview.  
3 See also Coval, Pan and Stafford (2014) who suggest that in derivatives markets, model misspecification only reveals 
itself in extreme circumstances, by which time it is too late. Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) present a model in which 
self-fulfilling credit market freezes can arise because of interdependence between firms. 
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II. Stylized Facts about Credit Booms and Busts 
We begin by laying out a set of stylized facts about the evolution of credit market sentiment. 
We primarily draw on previous work on the corporate credit market in the US, although we present 
a few new results and update the U.S. time-series evidence through 2014. We present the main 
results here and leave some details of the data construction for the Internet Appendix. 
Observation 1. Heightened credit market sentiment is associated with strong current credit 
growth and low subsequent returns. 
We start with the observation that there is a time-varying level of sentiment in credit 
markets. Greenwood and Hanson (2013) develop a simple measure of credit market overheating 
based on the composition of corporate debt issuance. Their measurethe share of all corporate 
bond issuance from speculative grade firmscaptures the intuition that when credit markets are 
overheated, low quality firms increase their borrowing to take advantage. Greenwood and Hanson 
(2013) show that declines in issuer quality are associated with concurrent growth in total corporate 
credit and that both quantity and quality predict low corporate bond returns. Adopting a similar 
intuition, Baron and Xiong (2015) show that bank credit expansion also predicts low equity returns 
in a large panel of countries. López-Salido, Stein and Zakrajšek (2015) show that measures of 
credit market sentiment also have forecasting power for business cycle activity. Relatedly, 
Schularick and Taylor (2012) show that elevated credit growth predicts future financial crises, and 
Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2016) show that growth in household credit is related to future GDP. 
Table 1 updates the data from Greenwood and Hanson (2013) through 2014 and also 
considers a set of additional proxies for credit market sentiment. The table shows regressions of 
the form: 
 ,HYt k t ta brx Sent      (1) 
where rx denotes the log excess return on high yield bonds over a 2- or a 3-year horizon, and Sent 
is a proxy for credit market sentiment, measuring using data through the end of year t. Excess 
returns are the difference between the return on the high yield bond index and duration-matched 
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Treasury bonds. All of our data begin in 1983.4 Columns (1) and (5) show that the log high yield 
share significantly predicts reductions in subsequent excess high yield returns. A one standard 
deviation in the log high yield share is associated with an 8.3 percentage point reduction in log 
returns over the next two years, or 9.7 percentage points over the next three years.  
Columns (2) and (6) of Table 1 show that the same forecasting results hold when credit 
market sentiment is measured as the growth in total credit. Aggregate corporate credit is the sum 
of corporate debt securities and loans from Table L103 of the Flow of Funds accounts. A one 
standard deviation increase in credit growth forecasts a 7.4 percentage point reduction in log 
returns over the next two years, or 9.3 percentage points over the next three years. 
Table 1 supplements these forecasting results with regressions based on two additional 
measures of credit market sentiment. The first is a measure based on the Federal Reserve’s senior 
loan officer survey, and the second is the expected bond premium EBP from Gilchrist and 
Zakrajšek (2012). 
Every quarter, the Fed surveys senior loan officer of major domestic banks concerning their 
lending standards to households and firms. Officers report whether they are easing or tightening 
lending standards in the past quarter. We construct a measure of credit market sentiment, Loansent, 
by taking the three-year average percentage of banks that have reported easing credit standards in 
any given quarter. The idea behind this aggregation is that sentiment captures the level of beliefs 
about future creditworthiness, whereas the quarterly survey measures changes from the previous 
quarter. The senior loan officer opinion survey begins in the first quarter of 1990, so this measure 
of sentiment based on this survey begins in December 1992. Loansent is 55% correlated with the 
high yield share and 68% correlated with the growth in aggregate corporate credit. 
Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) construct a measure of the price of corporate credit risk by 
analyzing interest rate spreads on traded corporate bonds. By forming an estimate of the true 
underlying default risk of the underlying firms, they measure a residual componentthe excess 
bond premium EBPthat can be interpreted as a measure of credit market sentiment. EBP is 41% 
                                                            
4 For results over different time horizons and with additional controls, see Greenwood and Hanson (2013) who 
compute alternate proxies for issuer quality that extend back as far as 1926.  
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correlated with the high yield share and 20% correlated with the growth in aggregate corporate 
credit. 
Table 1 shows that both of these additional measures of credit market sentiment forecast 
corporate bond returns in the expected direction. To summarize, Table 1 confirms that periods of 
high credit market sentiment are associated with growth in total credit, a loosening of credit 
standards, and are followed by low subsequent returns. 
Observation 2. Measures of credit market sentiment are correlated with current and lagged 
defaults; when default rates fall, sentiment rises. 
A key assumption in our model is that market participants extrapolate based on past credit 
market outcomes. While there is abundant evidence of investor extrapolation in other contexts,5 
we provide some preliminary evidence for the assumption of extrapolative expectations in credit 
markets, by analyzing the correlation between our investor sentiment measures and recent past 
default rates. Table 2 shows the results of time-series regressions of the form:  
 1 ,t t t tSent a b cDef Def       (2) 
where Def denotes the default rate on high yield bonds. We estimate this regression using the same 
four measures of credit market sentiment from Table 1. Some measures of sentiment (HYS and 
EBP) are more highly correlated with current default rates, while others are also strongly 
correlated with lagged defaults rates (Credit Growth and Loansent).   
Observation 3. Reductions in credit market sentiment induce future defaults. 
Our third observation is that changes in credit market sentiment can have a causal impact 
on near-term credit market outcomes. Whatever the fundamentals may be, when credit market 
sentiment declines, investors are reluctant to roll over debt, making future defaults more likely. 
We provide some tentative evidence for this observation in Table 3, which displays regressions of 
the form:  
                                                            
5 See Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) for a summary of this evidence. See also Dominguez (1986), Frankel and 
Froot 1987, 1988), Shiller, Kon-Ya and Tsutsui (1996), Case, Shiller and Thompson (2012), Amromin and Sharpe 
(2013), and Bacchetta, Mertens and Wincoop (2009).  
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 .t k t tDef a b Sent      (3) 
 The dependent variable is current or future defaults, and the independent variable is the 
change in sentiment in year t. Again, we draw on the four proxies for credit market sentiment used 
in Table 1.  Table 3 shows that changes in all four credit sentiment measures forecast defaults in 
the following year. For some of the measures of credit sentiment, changes are also correlated with 
contemporaneous defaults or defaults in year t + 2. 
III. The Model 
A. Setup and rational benchmark 
There are two types of agents, a single representative firm and a continuum of homogenous 
corporate bond investors.   
When the economy begins at time 0, the representative firm begins to invest in short-term 
projects; each project lasts for a dt period. Projects arrive continuously over time with intensity 
normalized to one and with a per-unit investment cost of I. Projects generate instantaneous cash 
flows ,tx which follows a regime-switching Markov process 
 ,1
1
H H
L L
t dt t dt
t
t
H L
H q dt q dt
q dt q dt
x x
x
x L
  
    
 


 (4) 
where , 0H Lq q  are the intensities for the transition from the high state H to the low state L and 
vice versa. That is, for a project that lasts from time t to t  dt, its payoff is set at time t  dt to .t dtx 
The flows of benefit and cost satisfy 
 .L I H   (5) 
Thus, a time-t project generates a net operating profit when t dt Hx   and generates a net operating 
loss when .t dt Lx   6 
 The firm needs to finance the projects by raising debt from investors. Average maturity of 
the debt is governed by the parameter , as follows. At time t, denote the number of outstanding 
                                                            
6 When the payoff becomes L, the firm may choose not to invest in the project. Here we do not allow the firm to do 
so: it must invest in the projects all the time regardless of their payoffs.  
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corporate bonds as Ft, the per-unit bond price as pt, the market value of outstanding debt as Dt = 
Ftpt. Each bond continuously pays coupons at an exogenous rate of k until the arrival of a Poisson 
shock with intensity . Upon the Poisson shock, the bond contract matures. And in the absence of 
default, the firm pays off the face value of maturing debt by issuing new debt. Maturity-triggering 
Poisson shocks are independent across bonds originated at different times, and are also 
independent of .tx  Outside of default, a fraction dt of outstanding debt matures every dt period. 
Thus the expected maturity of debt is 1/. 
 Non-maturing bonds are marked at the market price and the net operating profit is also 
converted to outstanding bonds at the market price.7 So, in the absence of default, the evolution of 
Dt is  
 )(1 ( ) .t dt tt dt t t dt
t t
Dkdt p dtD I x dt
p p
dt D  
      (6) 
Rearranging terms gives 
 
inflow/ou
inflow/outflow
from protflowrate of return
from maturing bondson non-maturing bo
ts
s
ec
n
j
d
(1 ) ( ).t t tt t t dt
t t
dD kdt D D Idp p o dt
dt p
x
dt p 
     
   
  
 (7) 
If the quantity on the right hand side of (7) is positive, the firm needs to raise this dollar amount 
by issuing new bonds; if this quantity is negative, the firm uses this dollar amount to repurchase 
outstanding bonds from investors.  
 Upon default, investors are entitled to a fraction   1 of the future coupon payments. In 
the absence of default, bonds will mature at their face value upon the arrivals of independent 
Poisson shocks with intensity .  
 There is a single homogenous group of risk neutral investors with a time discount rate of 
. Investors perceive a default likelihood of t and believe this same likelihood will hold at all 
future dates. We later describe how investors form their beliefs about t by extrapolating past 
outcomes. Given these assumptions, the market price per bond pt is given by 
                                                            
7 Due to time homogeneity of Poisson arrivals, all outstanding bonds share the same price. 
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b s t t t
t ttt
p e kds e ep     
       
   






  
 1 1        .

 (8) 
Solving equation (8), the price of debt is given by 
 
(1
.
)t t
kp k 
          (9) 
tp is always less than )/( )(k    because investors perceive some default risk and hence 
require a price discount to hold defaultable bonds. Naturally, for any   1, equation (9) shows 
that pt decreases in the perceived default likelihood, t. Furthermore, the bond yield in our model 
is   (1  )t and the credit spread is (1  )t. Thus, equation (9) says that the relationship 
between prices and yields is steeper for longer maturity (lower bonds.  
Equation (9) says that, when setting the bond price, investors do not directly take the 
evolution of Ft into account, nor do they pay direct attention to fundamentals. This is partly due to 
the fact that investors receive the coupon k instead of the net operating cash flows t Ix  and 
therefore may not know the fundamentals. Below we explain how prices and credit evolve if 
investors price credit more rationally.  
We now further specify an upper barrier and a lower barrier for Ft. We assume that, if Ft 
reaches a lower barrier 0F   and has a tendency of falling further, it is then floored at ,F and the 
extra net payoffs are distributed to equity holders in the form of dividends. If, on the other hand, 
Ft reaches an upper barrier F F and has a tendency of rising further, a default is triggered. In the 
event of default, a proportional write-down occurs: a fraction 1   of bond holdings is removed 
from the firm’s balance sheet, in which case the remaining number of bonds is .F  
The idea underlying the upper and lower barriers F and F can be motivated via the pecking 
order. Firms only raise external finance in the form of debt. And when there is free cash flow 
available to equity, they first use this cash flow to retire existing debts. However, once the face 
value of debt reaches a sufficiently low level, 0F  , they choose to pay out all available free cash 
flow to their equity holders. This lower threshold can be endogenized by assuming that the firm’s 
equity holders trade off the value of receiving dividends today versus the value of further debt 
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reduction. Further debt reduction lowers the future probability of default and hence raises the 
expected value of future dividends. Since the benefits of debt reduction decline with the level of 
debt, the firm chooses to pay out free cash flow to equity holders once the face value of debt 
reaches a certain value. 
To endogenize the upper threshold F , we could assume that at any time, equity holders 
can also default on their outstanding debt and abscond with some fraction of the firm’s total 
enterprise value. Equity holders decide whether or not to exercise this default option by comparing 
the present value of expected future dividends to the value of this outside default option. Since, all 
else equal, the present value of expected future dividends is decreasing in the amount of 
outstanding debt, this means that equity holders will choose to default once the face value of debt 
reaches a sufficiently high level F F . 
Based on the assumptions outlined above, we summarize the law of motion for the number 
of bonds:  
Assumption 1 (Law of Motion for Debt Financing). If F F F    
 (1 ) ( ) .t tt t t t dt
t t
kdt dp pdD dt dD D t dt
p dt p
I x 
        
 (10) 
Given that / ,t t tF D p (10) is equivalent to 
 [ (1 ) ] / .t t t t t dt tdF F p F dxI t pk       (11) 
If tF F   
 (1 ) 0[ (1 ) ] / .t t t t dtt F x t t t t dt tkF p IdF kF p F I dt px         1  (12) 
If ,tF F a default event is triggered and .t dtF F                    
To complete the model description, we now introduce our key assumption regarding how 
investors form their beliefs about future defaults. The perceived default likelihood t is a weighted 
average of past realized default rates, as described below:  
Assumption 2 (Endogenous Belief Formation). The default likelihood perceived by investors at 
time t is  
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 ( ) ( ) 0,,
t
s ds
t s
t s dse f dN
 


       (13) 
where s is the running variable for the integral, tN measures the number of default events that have 
taken place up to time t, the parameter  controls for how far investors extrapolate into the past, 
and f () measures how much impact a default has on the post-default level of t as a function of 
its pre-default level. For instance, if Ftdt = ,F a default occurs between time t  dt and t, and dNtdt 
 Nt  Ntdt  1, and t   tdt   f(tdt). The differential representation of (13) is8 
 
memory decay default impulse
( ) .t t t tdtd f dN        (14) 
 
 Equation (13) says that when a default occurs, it creates an instant contribution of ( )tf 
to the perceived default likelihood. As time elapses, investor memory decays exponentially at rate 
. Thus, a higher value of  means that investors place greater weight on recent events.  
Our specification of beliefs is the primary assumption in the model, and draws on evidence 
across a variety of settings that expectations of financial markets outcomes are extrapolative 
(Greenwood and Shleifer 2014, Koijen, Schmeling, and Vrugt 2015). It also matches the empirical 
evidence, presented earlier, that empirical measures of credit market sentiment seem to correlate 
strongly with recent default rates. As in Barberis, Greenwood, Jin and Shleifer (2015), we do not 
take a position on the source of investors’ extrapolative expectations, which could be driven by 
representativeness heuristic (as in Barberis, Shleifer, Vishny 1998 or Rabin 2002) or by experience 
effects (Malmendier and Nagel 2011).  
 The formation of beliefs is endogenous, because t is determined by past defaults, which 
were triggered by past beliefs of investors, past debt levels, and past realizations of fundamentals. 
At each point in time, our model is fully characterized by three state variables, , ,t tx F  and .t  
 Our assumption that beliefs are formed entirely in a backward-looking manner is stark, and 
can be contrasted with those of a more rational forward-looking investor. In the rational benchmark 
                                                            
8 The timing of belief update is not crucial: when a default occurs at time t  dt, whether it changes the investor belief 
at time t  dt or at time t does not affect our result. The reason is that in this model, the time-varying bond price only 
affects the incremental debt raised or repurchased by the firm, which, in continuous-time, is infinitesimal.   
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case, investors do not pay direct attention to past realized defaults because defaults are a function 
of other variables. Instead, investors are fully aware of the regime-switching process for tx in (4), 
the Poisson arrivals of bond maturity with intensity , the law of motion for Ft in (11) and (12), as 
well as the default trigger at Ft  F and the dividend trigger at Ft  .F So instead of (8), investors 
use all the available information to set the bond price tp as a function of tx and .tF  
Proposition 1 below summarizes the solution of bond prices in the rational benchmark. 
Proposition 1: Rational Bond Prices. In a fully rational model, the bond prices, ( )tHp F  and
( )tLp F are jointly determined by a system of two first-order non-linear ordinary differential 
equations 
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for ,tF F F   with the following boundary conditions 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ).H L H H L LF q pk q p F Fp Fp        (16)  
Here we assume )(1 ( ) 0;HF F Fk p I H     otherwise rational bond prices become 
degenerate. 9,10,11   
                                                            
9 In the rational benchmark, positive bond prices do not always exist. When the speed of debt accumulation is 
highfor instance, when I is much larger than Lrational investors’ self-fulfilling beliefs could drive pL (Ft) toward 
zero. In this case, there may not be a sustainable level of positive price that prevents pL from falling further. When the 
speed of debt accumulation is high, the default risk is high once the project payoff becomes low. This pushes down 
the bond price, which makes it more difficult for the firm to raise debt, causing the speed of debt accumulation to 
become even higher, essentially a downward spiral of the bond price. 
10 If the condition ( )) 0(1 HF p F F Ik H        does not hold, then once tF falls into the range [ ],F F it 
will always stay in that range. In the numerical examples we use, 1 ))(( HF p F Hk F I       stays negative. 
11 The system of non-linear differential equations cannot be solved analytically. We adopt a projection method with 
Chebyshev polynomials to solve this system numerically. Details of the numerical procedure are given in the Appendix. 
15 
 
 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.                   
B. Formal results 
We now turn to the main results. We start by describing the evolution of credit sentiment 
in good times. Second, we examine credit sentiment in bad times. We then take a closer look at 
model dynamics—transitions between good and bad times and the forecastability of returns—and 
compare the dynamics documented empirically. Lastly, we study the role of debt maturity.  
B.1 Credit sentiment in good times 
During credit booms, historical default rates have been low. Since bond investors 
extrapolate past defaults when forming their expectations about future defaults, they believe that 
future default rates will continue to be low. In the near term, these beliefs can be self-fulfilling: 
the perception of low future defaults leads to high bond prices, which, in turn, makes it easy for 
the firm to refinance existing debts and issue new debts. As a result, cheaper debt financing and 
slower debt accumulation can lead to a near-term decline in future defaults, and this further 
reinforces investors’ beliefs about future default rates.  
Below we elaborate on this narrative of credit sentiment in good times by making two 
related points. First and most simply, we show how greater optimism prolongs credit booms. 
Second, we show how longer periods of strong fundamentals allow the economy to sustain longer 
downturns in fundamentals before entering a credit bust. We describe a particular example of this, 
in which firms can have brief periods of “papering over losses” during which fundamentals worsen 
but investor optimism prevents firms from entering a default cycle. 
We start with the observation that greater optimism can prolong credit booms. From the 
bond price in (9) and the law of motion for tF in (11), we know that investor optimism (low t) 
pushes the bond price pt close to one. All else being equal, higher bond price makes it easier for 
firms to refinance. Investor optimism helps lower tF and hence keep the firm away from default, 
which in turn leads to greater investor optimism.  
Longer periods of strong fundamentals allow the economy to sustain longer downturns in 
fundamentals before entering a credit bust. To see this, suppose fundamentals stay at H from time 
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0 to t and switch to L thereafter. Under mild conditions, a later switch time (higher t) tends to delay 
defaults. This is because a longer period with good fundamentals tends to further lower Ft from the 
default barrier .F  As a result, it takes longer for the number of outstanding bonds to accumulate 
back to a high level after bad fundamentals arrive. There is also an important multiplier effect 
arising from beliefs. The longer the economy spends in good times without having a default, the 
lower is investors’ perceived likelihood of future defaults. Thus, even as fundamentals switch from 
H to L, the credit spread continues to fall, slowing down debt accumulation. Of course, because 
fundamentals have deteriorated, the economy eventually reaches the default barrier .F  The period 
immediately before reaching the upper barrier is one of “calm before the storm” because of 
simultaneously weak fundamentals but high prices/low credit spreads.  
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 below formalize these results. 
Proposition 2: Time Evolution of the Number of Outstanding Bonds. Suppose 0 .F F F  If
0 ,x H then, assuming that tx does not experience a transition, Ft deterministically evolves as 
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unless it gets capped by F or gets floored by .F    
Similarly, if 0 ,x L then, assuming that tx  does not experience a transition, Ft deterministically 
increases until it reaches the upper barrier .F  Specifically 
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so long as .tF F   Once ,tF F a default occurs and .t dtF F      
Proof: See the Appendix.                     
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Corollary 1: Passage Time until Default (Prolonged Credit Bubble). Suppose F  F0  ,F and 
suppose the project payoffs stay at H from time 0 to t and switch to L thereafter.  Also for simplicity 
suppose ( , ), 0 .lF F F l t     Then the post-switch passage time until default, denoted as s, is the 
unique solution of  
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The sensitivity of s with respect to t is 
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If (1 ) 0,t t tF pk F I H      then ( ) 0.s t    
Proof: See the Appendix.                             
We have noted that credit sentiment allows the firm to sustain longer downturns in 
fundamentals before entering a credit bust. An interesting example of this arises when elevated 
credit sentiment can allow the credit market to withstand temporary drops in fundamentals. 
Specifically, if fundamentals turn low for a short time and then turn high again, the firm can 
temporarily paper over losses without incurring default. We illustrate this phenomenon in Figure 
2 in which fundamentals switch from H to L for a period of time and then switch back to H. Panel 
A shows the path of fundamentals; Panel B shows the impact on debt growth and prices. Recall 
that investors do not pay direct attention to fundamentals, so investor optimism continues to rise 
after the firm fundamentals get worse until a default occurs, helping the firm to roll over debt and 
hence prolonging a credit boom.  
Panel C shows the contrast between this and the rational model, in which forward-looking 
investors significantly push down the bond price once the firm fundamentals switch from H to L, 
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well before a default occurs. Lower bond prices make it more difficult for the firm to raise debt 
and hence cause default to happen earlier.  
We note that while investor optimism sometimes allows the firm to paper over losses, it 
does so at the cost of increased fragility. This is because without inducing a default, the firm’s 
outstanding debt level remains high. Worsened fundamentals imply higher debt payments, 
contributing to a higher default risk. This finding suggests that even though a credit bubble can be 
further extended in the behavioral model due to investor optimism, fragility will remain high unless 
economic fundamentals stay healthy for a long time. 
 
Figure 2. Papering over Losses. Panel A plots the time evolution of fundamentals xt. In this example, the 
fundamentals are specified as xt  H for 0  t  0.5 and t  2.5 and xt  L for 0.5  t  2.5. Panel B plots the 
number of outstanding bonds Ft and the bond price pt for the behavioral model. Panel C plots, for 
comparison, the number of outstanding bonds Ft and the bond price pt for the rational model. The parameter 
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values are H  0.6, L  0.2, I  0.25, k  5%,   5%, F  1, F  0.5,   0.9,   0.9,   1/2, qH  0.2, 
and qL  0.5. The initial conditions are: F0  0.9 and 0  0.2.  
B.2 Credit sentiment in bad times 
 Upon default, credit markets enter bad times. Since bond investors extrapolate past 
defaults, they tend to believe that future default rates will continue to be high. If fundamentals 
remain poor, investors’ pessimism can be self-fulfilling: their perception of high future defaults 
pushes down bond prices, which makes it more difficult to raise more debt to refinance existing 
debt and cover the shortfall between the cash inflows and the ongoing investment costs. With 
accelerating debt accumulation, it shortens the time before the next default occurs. The increasing 
incidence of default further increases pessimism.    
 Below we present two results regarding credit sentiment in bad times. First, we describe 
the conditions under which pessimism can spiral during default cycles. Second, we show that the 
length of a credit downturn can affect the speed of subsequent market recovery when fundamentals 
eventually recover. 
 We start by describing how the economy may enter into a pessimism spiral. As we show 
below, it depends on how much beliefs update upon the realization of a default event. From the 
evolution of t in (14), upon default at time t, t jumps up by f (t), so the credit spread widens 
and the bond price drops. If fundamentals stay depressed, then Ft will keep rising again from F
towards .F  Thus, by the time the next default is triggered, whether or not the perceived default 
rate will have fallen by f (t) (back to the level before last default) depends on the parameter  
and the functional form of  f ().  
 For the remainder of the paper, we adopt a simple form for f (): 
 1)( ,tf     (21)  
where 1  is a constant, so that the contribution of default to beliefs does not depend on the pre-
default level of t. Figure 3 shows that when 1 is small (1  0.2), each “default cycle” is 
sufficiently long and a default’s impact on beliefs t is limited. As a result, when a default event 
occurs, investors do not become too pessimistic. In this case, default cycles are approximately of 
equal length. On the other hand, if 1 is high (1  1), each default has a larger impact on investor 
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beliefs, so that a series of defaults makes investors increasingly pessimistic. In this case, the length 
of default cycles decreases over time and spiraling investor pessimism arises.   
 
Figure 3. Defaults and Credit Sentiment in Bad Times. The top panel plots the time evolution of Ft with
)( 0.2tf   (blue line) and with )( 1tf   (red dot-dashed line). The bottom panel plots the time evolution 
of the perceived default likelihood t with )( 0.2tf   (blue line) and with )( 1tf   (red dot-dashed line). 
The other parameter values are: L  0.2, I  0.25, k  5%,   5%,  0.9,   0.9,   1/2, 1,F  and 0  
0.2. Fundamentals stay at L, and 0 .F F    
Our second observation about credit sentiment during bad times is that the length of the 
downturn significantly affects the speed of subsequent market recovery. A longer downturn leads 
bond investors to be more pessimistic, pushing down the bond price. Since spreads are high, the 
firm may have to raise more debt even when fundamentals improve. In other words, through the 
belief channel in our model, a longer credit downturn is followed by a slower market recovery.  
Figure 4 formalizes this point by providing an example in which fundamentals switch back 
from L to H at either t  5 (the top two panels) or t  1.5 (the bottom two panels). When the switch 
occurs at t  5, continuing investor pessimism causes debt Ft to keep rising after the switch, even 
though fundamentals have improved. On the other hand, when the switch occurs at t  1.5, the 
level of investor pessimism is not that high at the switch. As a result, good fundamentals lead to 
debt reduction right away, and the credit market recovers quickly.   
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Figure 4. Market Recovery after Downturns. The figure shows that the length of the downturn in 
fundamentals affects the speed of eventual market recovery. The top two panels plot the time evolutions of 
Ft and t when fundamentals recover in period 5. The bottom two panels plot the time evolutions of Ft and t when fundamentals recover in period 1.5. Fundamentals stay at L before the recovery and stay at H 
thereafter. The parameter values are: H  0.3, L  0.1, I  0.125, k  5%,   5%,  0.9,   0.9,   1/2, 
1  1, 1,F   and 0.5.F   The initial debt level is 0F F  and the initial belief is 0 0.1.   
Taking stock of the results so far, we have shown that when investors extrapolate, the 
evolution of the credit market is highly path dependent and seemingly disconnected from 
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fundamentals. Figure 5 illustrates these features “through the cycle” by comparing debt growth 
and prices in our model with those that would materialize in the rational benchmark case. The 
example we consider here, fundamentals start high, fall for a number of periods, and then 
permanently recover in period 7.5.  
 
Figure 5. Through the Cycle Comparison between Model and Rational Benchmark. Panel A plots the 
time evolution of fundamentals xt. In this example, the fundamentals are specified as xt  H for 0  t  0.5 
and t  7.5 and xt  L for 0.5  t  7.5. Panel B plots the number of outstanding bonds Ft and the bond price 
pt for the behavioral model. Panel C plots, for comparison, the number of outstanding bonds Ft and the bond 
price pt for the rational model. The parameter values are H  0.3, L  0.1, I  0.125, k  5%,   5%, F  
1, F  0.5,   0.9,   0.9,   1/2, qH  0.2, qL  0.5, and 1  1. The initial conditions are: F0  0.9 and 0  0.2. 
The figure shows many features of credit booms and busts that we have already noted. 
Investor optimism prolongs credit booms: after the fundamentals switch from H to L at t  0.5, it 
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takes longer for the first default to occur in the behavioral model than in the rational benchmark. 
Second, after fundamentals switch to L, the bond price continues to rise in the behavioral model 
because of increasing investor optimism. In the rational model, the bond price drops because 
rational investors understand that with low fundamentals, the firm needs to raise more debt, and 
as a result default risks go up. Third, during bad times (0.5  t  7.5), the bond price oscillates with 
a clear downward trend in the behavioral model, but with no trend in the rational model. In the 
behavioral model, the bond price is path-dependent and can get pushed down further after more 
defaults with spiraling investor pessimism. Lastly, after fundamentals switch back to H at t  7.5, 
the firm in the rational model immediately begins to retire debt because rational bond price jumps 
up due to lower default risks. However, in the behavioral model, the firm has to keep raising more 
debt even in the presence of improved fundamentals: investor pessimism is persistent and it keeps 
the bond price low. Overall, there are a lot of differences in the path of prices and quantities 
between Panel B and Panel C, despite being driven by identical paths in fundamentals.  
B.3 Sentiment, credit growth, and return predictability 
One stark contrast between the rational model and the behavioral model concerns the 
predictability of bond returns. In the rational model, no observable variable predicts future bond 
returns. In the behavioral model, many variables do. We summarize our analytical results on 
predictability in the proposition below.  
Proposition 3: Return Predictability. In absence of bond maturity, the instantaneous bond gross 
return from time t to t  dt is  
 , .( ) /t dt tt t dtR kdt p p    (22) 
When bond matures, its instantaneous return is , 1/ .t t dt tR p   
In the rational benchmark, over any finite time period [t, T], the rationally expected continuously 
compounded gross return is 
 ,
( )[ ] .r T tt t TR e
   (23) 
In the behavioral model, in the absence of default, the subjective expected gross return perceived 
by bond investors from time t to t  dt is 
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b
t t dt tR dt      (24) 
On the other hand, the objective expected gross return measured by outside econometricians, in 
the absence of default, is 
 ,
(1 )[ ] 1 (1 ) .
)(1
r
t t dt
t
t t
t
R dt
                
   (25) 
Proof: See the Appendix.                     
As described in Proposition 3, in the rational benchmark, the expected returneither 
instantaneous or over any finite horizonis always independent of any state variables in the 
economy. Bond prices fully incorporate in any future default risks that are known ex ante. In the 
behavioral model, behavioral bond investors subjectively believe they have fully priced all future 
default risks when valuing corporate bonds. However, given their backward-looking belief 
formation, they make systematic mistakes.  
A few observations from (25) are worth noting. First, in the absence of default, the true 
expected gross return in the behavioral model is always greater than 1  dt, for two reasons: 1) 
behavioral bond investors are concerned about an immediate default with a perceived likelihood 
t, but a default never actually occurs immediately if Ft  F —this effect is captured by the term 
(1  )tdt; and 2) behavioral bond investors do not realize that t will decrease over time in the 
absence of default, and that decrease in t will lead to bond price appreciation—this effect is 
captured by the term [(1  )t/(    (1  )t)]dt.  
Second, the wedge between the true expected return and the subjective required return 1  
dt monotonically increases in t.  Put differently, future returns are inversely related to the level 
of credit sentiment.  This means that the post-default short-term bond returns—short term in the 
sense that the next default has not arrived—are abnormally high in the behavioral model. This 
finding mimics the abnormally high equity premium of the stock market after financial crises 
discussed in Jin (2015) and shown in several empirical studies (Muir 2015, Krishnamurthy and 
Muir 2015). For comparison, notice that high post-default short-term bond returns do not arise in 
the rational benchmark; bond price in that model always adjusts so that the expected gross return 
equals 1  dt.  
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Third, upon default, the instantaneous gross return becomes   O(dt), where   . 
Because behavioral bond investors are backward-looking when forecasting future default risks, 
the bond price jumps down upon default, and at the same time investors’ ownership of future 
coupons is reduced to a fraction of .  
Finally, longer-term expected bond returns in the behavioral model may well be lower than 
those in the rational model. As we see in Figure 5, over-pessimism of bond investors in the 
behavioral model may well accelerate future defaults, and more frequent defaults can lead to more 
negative bond returns.  
Running forecasting regressions on bond returns over a finite time horizon cannot be done 
analytically. We implement these forecasting regressions through numerical simulations and then 
compare our results with the forecasting results we showed earlier in Tables 1, 2 and 3.  
Table 4 performs this exercise. The top panels show autocorrelations measured at different 
horizons; the middle panel shows return forecasting regressions, and the bottom panels show the 
results of default forecasting regressions. Results are based on the following set of parameter 
values: H  0.6, L  0.2, I  0.25, k  5%,   5%, F  1, F  0.5,   0.9,   0.9, qH  0.2, qL  
0.5, and 1  1. We show results for average 5-year debt ( = 1/5) and 2-year debt ( = 1/2). 
Table 4 yields the following observations: 
Autocorrelation of Returns: In the model, returns are positively autocorrelated at short 
horizons and negatively autocorrelated at longer horizons. Short-term momentum can arise from 
the following channel. During a credit boom bond returns are on average high in absence of 
defaults. At the same time, investors are quite optimistic (t is low) and this helps to slow down 
debt accumulation and hence delays defaults, leading to high bond returns in the short term. This 
is an important sense in which credit market sentiment is partially self-fulfilling in our model in 
the short run. Long-term reversal arises because defaults will eventually occur after a long credit 
boom when Ft hits M. Also any autocorrelation will eventually get washed out by the randomness 
of fundamentals. 
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Defaults and Spreads: Defaults and spreads are positively correlated at all horizons with 
the autocorrelation decaying with horizon. A high autocorrelation of defaults is a manifestation of 
the persistence of the underlying state variables in the model. A high Ft, a high t, or a low xt today 
suggests, on average, tomorrow Ft will be high, t will be high, and xt will be low. In other words, 
there is persistence in default occurrences from the model. The persistence in t drives the 
autocorrelation in spreads because in our model spread is defined as (1  )t.  
High levels of credit spreads predict high future returns on risky bonds: High levels of 
credit spreads coincide with pessimistic beliefs of bond investors (a high t) in the model, and the 
most typical time for this to occur is when a new credit cycle begins (with a high xt) after a sequence 
of defaults. This suggests that subsequent returns are high, both because bond prices will 
appreciate over time and because the dividend yield (coupon rate divided by bond price) is high. 
High levels of debt (Ft) predict low and then high future returns on risky bonds: All else 
being equal, high levels of debt suggest that in the near future the default risk is high and hence 
bond returns are low. However, once the fundamental switches from L to H, the credit market 
tends to recover. With lingering pessimistic but recovering beliefs, the bond returns become high 
as we discussed above. This explains why high levels of debt predict high future returns over 
longer horizons.  
High levels of past debt growth (Ft  Ft3) predict low future returns on risky bonds: High 
levels of debt growth typically occur during the later stage of a credit bubble; during the earlier 
stage, the fundamental xt stays high and therefore the level of debt decreases. The late stage of a 
credit boom is marked by a deterioration in fundamentals and more rapid debt growth. As a result, 
high levels of debt growth are typically followed by defaults that drive down bond returns. This 
closely matches empirical findings in Table 1 and Greenwood and Hanson (2013), Baron and 
Xiong (2015) and López-Salido, Stein, and Zakrajšek (2015). 
Reductions in Sentiment (increases in t) predict higher future defaults: Consistent with 
the results in Table 3, Table 4 shows that in our model, increases in perceived future defaults lead 
27 
 
 
 
to actual defaults. This effect is strongest in the short run, and subsides at longer horizons. The 
table also shows that the level of sentiment predicts defaults.  
High levels of debt (Ft) and debt growth predict high future defaults on risky bonds: All 
else being equal, a higher Ft brings the economy closer to the default barrier so by construction 
future default risks are high. This effect is sometimes smaller in the short run because initially high 
debt growth can reflect high sentiment, which serves as an offset. 
High levels of operating cash flow (xt) predict low future defaults on risky bonds: When xt 
equals H, firms retire bond and this moves Ft away from M and therefore reduces future default 
risks.  
B.4 The role of debt maturity 
 Debt maturity plays an important role in our model. Shortening debt maturity can make the 
provision of credit become more exposed to investor sentiment: shorter-term debt needs to be 
rolled over more frequently, and hence changes in credit sentiment can have a larger effect on debt 
financing. At the same time, shortening debt maturity also reduces the life of each bond and hence 
reduces the likelihood that it defaults.  
 Below we elaborate on the role of debt maturity by making two points. First, longer debt 
maturity makes debt financing less imminent, prolonging credit booms, particularly when credit 
sentiment is high. However, when credit sentiment is low, shorter debt maturity makes debt 
financing more difficult, causing faster debt accumulation. In this case, shorter debt maturity leads 
to a slower recovery after credit busts. 
 We first show that longer debt maturity can prolong credit booms. In Figure 6 below, 
fundamentals stay high from t  0 to t  0.5 and switch to low thereafter. With short maturity (  
½, implying an a average maturity of 2 years), default occurs around t  2.25, but with long 
maturity (  0.1, implying an average maturity of 10 years), default does not occur until slightly 
before t  2.5. Longer maturity creates two effects. On the one hand, it helps firms to reduce debt 
when fundamentals are high. So by the time fundamentals deteriorate from high to low, the debt 
level is lower and hence further away from its default barrier in the case of long maturity. On the 
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other hand, longer maturity slows down debt accumulation after fundamentals become low 
because refinancing is less frequent, further prolonging the credit boom. Both effects are stronger 
when credit sentiment is high and bond price is high. 
 
Figure 6. Debt Maturity and Credit Boom. Panel A plots the time evolution of fundamentals xt. In this 
example, the fundamentals are specified as xt  H for 0  t  0.5 and xt  L for t  0.5. Panel B plots the 
number of outstanding bonds Ft and the bond price pt with   0.5. Panel C plots, for comparison, the 
number of outstanding bonds Ft and the bond price pt with   0.1. The other parameter values are H  0.3, 
L  0.1, I  0.125, k  5%,   5%, F  1, F  0.5,   0.9,   0.9, and 1  1. The initial conditions are: 
F0  0.9 and 0  0.5. 
 Debt maturity plays a particularly important role during downturns, in which case short-
term debt can slow down credit market recovery after a sequence of defaults. With short debt 
maturity, the firm needs to roll over maturing bonds very frequently. When credit sentiment is 
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lowthat is, when investors believe that future default rates are highbond price is low and credit 
spread is high. As a result, frequently rolling over debt becomes particularly expensive. In this 
case, even after fundamentals improve from L to H, the firm may need to keep accumulating debt, 
causing more defaults to happen and resulting in a slow recovery. Figure 7 below illustrates this 
point. 
 
Figure 7. Debt Maturity and Credit Market Recovery. Panel A plots the time evolution of fundamentals 
xt. In this example, the fundamentals are specified as xt  L for 0  t  5 and xt  H for t  5. Panel B plots 
the number of outstanding bonds Ft and the bond price pt with   0.5. Panel C plots, for comparison, the 
number of outstanding bonds Ft and the bond price pt with   0.1. The other parameter values are H  0.3, 
L  0.1, I  0.125, k  5%,   5%, F  1, F  0.5,   0.9,   0.9, and 1  1. The initial conditions are: 
F0  0.9 and 0  0.51.  
IV. Extensions: Multiple Firms and Belief Contagion 
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One of the limitations of our model is that, because it is based on a single firm, defaults 
are binary events. In this section, we extend the model to consider multiple firms. Although the 
qualitative conclusions we draw are largely the same, this extension has the advantage of 
mapping more closely to the continuous default rates that we observe in the real world. We also 
use it to explore belief contagion. Belief contagion can arise if investors update their beliefs 
about future defaults based on the default of any firm in the economy (in the real world, 
downgrades might serve a similar purpose).  
We assume that there are M firms, i  1, 2, , M. We will focus on the limiting case in 
which M grows large.  
 For the cash flow of each firm, we assume it consists of two components: a systematic 
component that evolves according to (4) and a firm-specific component. Specifically,  
 , , ,i t t i tx x      (26) 
where ,i t follows    
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 (27) 
Thus, the mean of ,i t is zero and the parameter q governs the persistence of these firm-specific 
shocks.  
 We now impose the key assumption that each firm updates its perceived likelihood of 
future defaults when any firm in the economy defaults. In other words,    
 ( ) ( ) 0,,
t
s ds
t s
t s dse f dN
 


       (28) 
where 1
1
M
itit
N M N   is the cumulative aggregate-level default rate up to time t. In other 
words, a default event for firm i between time t and time t  dt contributes 1/M to the change of 
N over the same period. When M grows large, changes of t become smooth because only a small 
fraction of firms default at each point in time. 
 The price of debt for all firms is still given by12   
                                                            
12 In the rational benchmark, with different debt levels, investors will price corporate bonds differently. 
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
  (29) 
And the outstanding debt for firm i evolves according to  
 , , , ,[ (1 ) ] / .i t i t t i t i t dt tdF kF p F I dtx p      (30) 
If ,i tF F   
 
, ,,, (1 ) 0 , , ,
[ (1 ) ] / .
i t i i ttt dtF x ii t kF p I t t i t i t dt t
dF kF p F xI dt p         1  (31) 
If , ,i tF F a default event is triggered and , .i t dtF F    
 We start our analysis by setting a uniform distribution of firms over the range of ( , )F F at 
time 0. That is  
 ,0
( 1 , 1,)
1
2, , .i
F iFM iF i M
M
  
    (32) 
Also for each firm i, we randomly draw the initial firm-specific cash flow shock ,0i  from {, } 
with equal probabilities.  
Figure 8 shows the evolution of credit and defaults in the multiple firm model. The 
systematic component of cash flow stays high from t  0 to t  0.5 and from t  7.5 to t  10, 
temporarily switching to low between t  0.5 and t  7.5. We plot the average number of 
outstanding bonds ,tF the bond price pt, the perceived default likelihood t, as well as the actual 
default rate averaged over the past quarter. With multiple firms in the economy (M  500), the 
perceived default likelihood drops between t  0 and t  1.5; even after fundamentals switch 
from high to low, t continues to fall and bond prices rise for about a year. During this time, the 
default rate stays at zero because all the firms retire debt between t  0 and t  0.5 and therefore 
it takes some time for the debt level to accumulate up to F after fundamentals deteriorate. Once 
fundamentals have fallen, the average debt level gradually climbs up and plateaus at around 0.95 
by t  6. The first firm defaults at t  1.22, nearly 9 months after the fundamentals deteriorated. 
Although both the perceived and the actual default rates rise over time, the average debt level 
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stops rising because, for the firms which go through default, their debt level drops by fraction of 
1  , keeping the average debt level stay below .F 13  
 
Figure 8. Multiple Firms and Credit Cycle. Panel A plots the time evolution of the systematic component 
of cash flows xt. In this example, xt  H for 0  t  0.5 and 7.5  t  10, and xt  L for 0.5  t  7.5. Panel B 
plots the average number of outstanding bonds tF and the bond price pt. Panel C plots the perceived default 
likelihood t. Panel D plots the percentage of defaulting firms averaged over the past quarter. The 
parameter values are: H  0.6, L  0.2, I  0.25, k  5%,   5%, F  1, F  0.5,   0.9,   0.9,   1/2, 
  500,   0.05, and q  0.5. The initial conditions are: Fi,0 is uniformly distributed between F and ,F
and 0  0.5.  
Beyond adding realism, the multiple-firms extension allows us to consider belief 
contagion: if one firm defaults, this adversely impacts the terms of credit for all other firms. 
Intuitively, belief contagion is most extreme when there is dispersion in the quality of firms 
borrowing. Specifically, under general conditions, adding a mean-preserving spread to the 
                                                            
13 The realized default rate is the percentage of defaulting firms averaged over the past quarter: a default rate of 
1.8% (at around t  7.5) indicates that on average, a firm defaults every 0.22 years. 
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distribution of outstanding bonds across firms tends to add fragility to the economy: When 
adverse fundamental shocks arrive, a more dispersed distribution of firms’ outstanding bonds is 
more likely to lead to defaults, and firm-specific defaults impose negative externality on the 
economy as a whole, resulting in quicker transitions to default for the firms that have not yet 
defaulted.  
V. Conclusions 
We present a model of credit market sentiment in which investors extrapolate past defaults. 
Our key contribution is to model the endogenous two-way feedback between credit market 
sentiment and credit market outcomes. This feedback mechanism is unique to credit markets 
because firms must return to the market to refinance their debts. 
Our analysis leaves open at least two areas for further analysis. First, we have not allowed 
for any relationship between conditions in credit markets and the fundamentals of the economy. 
Such a relationship plays a major role in Austrian accounts of credit cycles: as the credit boom 
grows, increasing amounts of capital are devoted to poor quality projects. Incorporating this aspect 
into our model may further enhance the feedback between sentiment and credit market outcomes.  
Second, we have been silent on issues of welfare and optimal policy, even though our 
model suggests a potential role. During credit booms, high sentiment can prevent defaults from 
occurring in the near future, which can be welfare-improving if fundamentals recover soon enough. 
Nonetheless, self-fulfilling beliefs during default spirals can be welfare-reducing, both because 
these deteriorating beliefs accelerate future default realizations and because they lead to a slow 
recovery in the presence of improving fundamentals.  Accepting this at face value suggests a role 
for policy in moderating investor beliefs.  
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Appendices 
Proof of Proposition 1. If 0 Hx  and tx does not experience a transition, (9), (11) and (14) then 
imply that before tF  gets capped by F or gets floored by F      
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The homogenous solution for (A1) is  
  0(1 )( ,) exp thF tt eK        (A2) 
where K is a coefficient that needs to be determined by the initial condition. Given (A2), a 
particular solution for the differential equation (A1) is 
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Rearranging terms gives  
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If 0 Lx  and tx does not experience a transition, then (A5) becomes  
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And ( )F t in this case monotonically increases until it hits the upper barrier of .F                          
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Proof of Corollary 1. Combining (17) and (18) gives  
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Taking derivatives with respect to t on both sides of (A7) and treating s as a function of t, we obtain 
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Notice from (11) that if for some time l, (1 ) 0,l l lF pk F I H     then for any subsequent time 
h  l, so long as fundamentals stay at H, the number of outstanding debt will decrease. As a result, 
when (1 ) 0,t t tF pk F I H     ( ) 0.F t   Given that ( ) 0,F t  if 0( ) ,s t   a contradiction arises: 
the left hand side of (A8) is less than or equal to zero but the right hand side is strictly positive. As 
a result, 0( ) .s t                                    
Proof of Proposition 2. For ,tF F F   the definitions of ( )tHp F and ( )tLp F give 
 
( ) , ) ,
( ) , ) ,
[ ( | ],
[ ( | ].
H t dt
L t d
dt
t t dt t t
dt
t t dt t tt
p F kdt e H F
p
p
F kdt e
F x x
p F L Fx x



 

  
  


 
 
 (A9) 
From the regime-switching process for tx in (4) and the assumption of Poisson arrival of random 
maturity, we can write (A9) as    
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Taking expectations and rearranging terms 
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Substituting (11) into (A11) then gives (15). 
When ,tx H ,tF F and assume that )(1 ( ) 0,HF F Fk p I H     (12) requires tF to be 
floored at F so 0.tdF  Hence, the first equation in (A11) implies 
( ) ( ) ( ).H L H HF Fk q p q p     When t Lx  and ,tF F the default rule requires
).( ) (L LF pp F                                                                      
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Proof of Proposition 3. In the rational benchmark, (15) implies that for ,tF F F  in absence of 
default, the instantaneous expected gross return always equals 1  dt. When tF F and ,tx H
the first boundary condition in (16) guarantees that the instantaneous gross return also equals 1  
dt. When tF F and ,tx L the second boundary condition in (16) and the second equation in (A9) 
imply that the expected instantaneous gross return is 1  dt. Putting these together, in the rational 
benchmark, over any finite time period [t, T], the expected continuously compounded gross return 
is ( ).T te   
In the behavioral model, (8) and (9) imply that from the investors’ perspective, the subjective 
instantaneous expected gross return, in absence of default, equals 1  dt. That is,  
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And bond investors pay no attention to the default trigger rule Ft  .F However, from outside 
econometricians’ perspective, the objective instantaneous expected gross return is time-varying. 
For ,tF F F   (8) and (9) give  
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 
Solving the System of Ordinary Differential Equations. The value of Ft ranges from F   to ,F
whereas the domain for Chebyshev polynomials is [1, 1]. So we transform Ft to a new state 
variable zt 
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Define ( ) ( ( ))H Hy Fpz z  and ( ) ( ( )).L Ly F zpz  The differential equations in (15) can be rewritten 
as  
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And the boundary conditions in (16) can be rewritten as 
 2( 1) ( ) ( 1), (1 () .)H L H H L Lk q y y y
F F Fq y
F F
              
 (A16) 
We apply the projection method to solve ( )Hy z and ( ).Ly z Specifically, we approximate these two 
functions by   
 
0 0
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where ( )rT z is the rth degree Chebyshev polynomial of the first kind.14 The projection method 
chooses the coefficients 0{ }
n
r ra  and 0{ }
m
r rb  so that the differential equations and the boundary 
conditions are approximately satisfied. One criterion for a good approximation is a minimum 
weighted sum of squared errors 
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(A18) 
where 0{ }i i
Nz  are the N zeros of ( )NT z and K1 and K2 are positive numbers. By the Chebyshev 
interpolation theorem, if N is sufficiently larger than n and m, and if the sum of weighted square 
in (A18) is sufficiently small, the approximated functions ˆ ( )Ly z and ˆ ( )Hy z are very close to the true 
solutions.       
For the numerical results in the main text, we set m  20, n  20, N  500, and K1  K2  108. We 
then apply the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm and obtain a minimized sum of squared errors less 
than 107. The small size of errors indicates a good convergence of the numerical solution. The 
solution is also insensitive to the choice of n, m, N, K1, or K2. These findings indicate that the 
numerical solutions are sufficient approximations for the true y functions. 
  
                                                            
14 See Mason and Handscomb (2003) for detailed discussion of the properties of Chebyshev polynomials.  
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Table 1. Credit Market Sentiment. 
Time-series regressions of the form 
ε ,HYt k t ta brx Sent     
where Sentt denotes investor sentiment in year t. The dependent variable is the cumulative 2-, or 3-year excess return 
on high-yield bonds. HYS is the fraction of nonfinancial corporate bond issuance with a high-yield rating from 
Moody’s. The percentage change in corporate credit is computed using Table L103 from the Flow of Funds. Loansent 
is the three-year average of the percentage of loan officers reporting a loosening of underwriting standards. EBP is the 
expected bond premium from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions (in 
brackets) are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors, allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  2-year future excess returns 3-year future excess returns 
Log(HYS) -15.95       -18.63      
  [-3.06] [-3.78]  
Growth of Corporate Credit   -126.50       -158.02    
    [-2.28] [-2.86] 
Loansent     -0.57       -0.80  
    [-2.12]   [-4.03] 
EBP       19.29       24.72 
    [2.43]   [4.79] 
Constant -15.67 11.46 -0.27 3.25 -17.54 14.93 -1.26 4.51 
  [-2.18] [3.85] [-0.06] [0.94] [-2.29] [4.42] [-0.21] [1.15] 
N 29 29 20 29 28 28 19 28 
R-squared 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.16 0.38 0.32 
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Table 2. Credit Market Sentiment and Current and Past Default Rates. 
Time-series regressions of the form 
1 ,t t t tSent a b cDef Def       
where Def denotes the default rate on speculative grade bonds, and Sent is a measure of credit market sentiment. HYS 
is the fraction of nonfinancial corporate bond issuance with a high-yield rating from Moody’s. The percentage change 
in corporate credit is computed using Table L103 from the Flow of Funds. Loansent is the three-year average of the 
percentage of loan officers reporting a loosening of underwriting standards. EBP is the expected bond premium from 
Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions (in brackets) are based on Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors, allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log(HYS) 
Growth of 
Corporate Credit Loansent EBP 
         
Deft -0.113 -0.005 -3.425 0.104 
  [-2.21] [-1.22] [-11.19] [4.98] 
Deft-1 0.009 -0.008 -2.152 -0.021 
  [0.44] [-3.47] [-4.24] [-0.96] 
Constant -0.734 0.118 18.076 -0.36 
  [-3.47] [7.92] [4.58] [-2.21] 
N 31 31 22 30 
R-squared 0.400 0.436 0.813 0.426 
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Table 3. Reductions in Sentiment lead to Increases in Default Rates. 
Time-series regressions of the form 
,t k t tDef a b Sent      
where Deftk denotes the default rate on speculative grade bonds in year t+k, and ΔSentt is the one-year change in credit market sentiment in year t. HYS is the 
fraction of nonfinancial corporate bond issuance with a high-yield rating from Moody’s. The percentage change in corporate credit is computed using Table L103 
from the Flow of Funds. Loansent is the three-year average of the percentage of loan officers reporting a loosening of underwriting standards. EBP is the expected 
bond premium from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions (in brackets) are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors, 
allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Deft Deft+1 Deft+2 Deft Deft+1 Deft+2 Deft Deft+1 Deft+2 Deft Deft+1 Deft+2 
 
      
ΔLog(HYS) -0.793 -2.853 -1.289                  
  [-0.75] [-3.67] [-1.97]          
ΔCredit Growth       -54.135 -37.168 3.947            
      [-5.69] [-3.08] [0.34]        
ΔLoansent             0.093 0.132 0.044      
        [3.08] [13.97] [1.98]    
ΔEBP                   -0.380 4.281 1.757 
            [-0.51] [5.04] [1.71] 
Constant 4.663 4.751 4.748 4.594 4.648 4.717 4.113 3.486 3.908 4.723 4.762 4.761 
  [7.18] [8.33] [7.22] [11.19] [8.72] [6.65] [8.19] [13.18] [5.54] [6.77] [8.66] [7.26] 
Observations 31 30 29 31 30 29 24 23 22 29 29 28 
R-squared 0.022 0.283 0.058 0.530 0.250 0.003 0.390 0.859 0.103 0.003 0.420 0.070 
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Table 4. Simulations and Return Forecasting Results in the Model.  
We show 1-5 year autocorrelations and return forecasting regressions for cash flows, the face value of debt, the number of defaults, beliefs, and returns. The 
second panel shows coefficients from forecasting regressions of t+k returns on variables in the model where k  1 to 5 years. Results are based on the following 
set of parameter values: H  0.6, L  0.2, I  0.25, k  5%,   5%, F  1, F  0.5,   0.9,   0.9, qH  0.2, qL  0.5, and 1  1. We show results for average 
5-year debt ( = 1/5) and 2-year debt ( = 1/2). 
  Panel A: 5-year debt ( = 1/5) Panel B: 2-year debt ( = 1/2) 
 Autocorrelations 1-yr 2-yr 3-yr 4-yr 5-yr 1-yr 2-yr 3-yr 4-yr 5-yr 
          (1) Cashflow (xt) 0.52  0.13 0.06 0.03 0.52 0.26 0.13 0.06 0.03 
          (2) Debt face value (Ft) 0.81 0.56 0.37 0.22 0.12 0.83 0.59 0.40 0.26 0.15 
          (3) Number of defaults (Nt) 0.79  0.35 0.21 0.12 0.78 0.54 0.34 0.21 0.12 
          (4) Beliefs (t) 0.89 0.68 0.48 0.31 0.19 0.88 0.68 0.48 0.32 0.20 
          (5) Returns (Rt) 0.42 0.02 -0.13 -0.16 -0.15 0.35 0.00 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 
 Univariate return forecasting 1-yr 2-yr 3-yr 4-yr 5-yr 1-yr 2-yr 3-yr 4-yr 5-yr 
          (1) Cashflow (xt) 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
          (2) Debt face value (Ft) -0.12 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.22 -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.10 
          (3) Debt growth (Ft  Ft3) -0.25 -0.14 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 
          (4) Beliefs (t) 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 
          (5) Belief change (t  t1)  -0.16 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05 
 Univariate default forecasting 1-yr 2-yr 3-yr 4-yr 5-yr 1-yr 2-yr 3-yr 4-yr 5-yr 
          (1) Cashflow (xt) -0.79 -0.79 -0.79 -0.78 -0.79 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 -0.66 -0.66 
          (2) Debt face value (Ft) 2.87 2.77 2.56 2.26 1.86 2.36 2.26 2.07 1.80 1.47 
          (3) Debt growth (Ft  Ft3) 0.49 0.72 0.90 1.01 1.00 0.47 0.66 0.81 0.88 0.86 
          (4) Beliefs (t) 0.83 0.56 0.35 0.21 0.11 0.83 0.56 0.35 0.22 0.12 
          (5) Belief change (t  t1)  1.20 0.90 0.63 0.42 0.27 1.12 0.88 0.58 0.41 0.26 
 
